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Abstract
Situation calculus has been applied widely in ar-
tificial intelligence to model and reason about ac-
tions and changes in dynamic systems. Since ac-
tions carried out by agents will cause constant
changes of the agents’ beliefs, how to manage
these changes is a very important issue. Shapiro
et al. [22] is one of the studies that considered
this issue. However, in this framework, the prob-
lem of noisy sensing, which often presents in
real-world applications, is not considered. As a
consequence, noisy sensing actions in this frame-
work will lead to an agent facing inconsistent
situation and subsequently the agent cannot pro-
ceed further. In this paper, we investigate how
noisy sensing actions can be handled in iterated
belief change within the situation calculus for-
malism. We extend the framework proposed in
[22] with the capability of managing noisy sens-
ings. We demonstrate that an agent can still de-
tect the actual situation when the ratio of noisy
sensing actions vs. accurate sensing actions is
limited. We prove that our framework subsumes
the iterated belief change strategy in [22] when
all sensing actions are accurate. Furthermore, we
prove that our framework can adequately handle
belief introspection, mistaken beliefs, belief revi-
sion and belief update even with noisy sensing, as
done in [22] with accurate sensing actions only.
1 Introduction
Situation calculus, introduced by John McCarthy [14, 15],
has been applied widely to model and reason about ac-
tions and changes in dynamic systems. It was reinterpreted
in [17] as basic action theories which are comprised of a
set of foundational axioms defining the space of situations,
unique-name axioms for actions, action preconditions and
effects axioms, and the initial situation axioms [8]. The
well known frame problem is solved by a set of special ac-
tion effects axioms called successor state axioms.
Since actions carried out by agents cause constant changes
of the agents’ beliefs, developing strategies of managing
belief changes triggered by actions is an important issue.
The problem of iterated belief change within the frame-
work of situation calculus has been investigated widely,
e.g., [19, 20, 22, 13]. In [22], a new framework exceeding
previous approaches was proposed in which a plausibility
value is attached to every situation. This way, the frame-
work is able to deal with nested beliefs, belief introspec-
tion, mistaken beliefs, and it can also handle belief revision
and belief update (two types of belief changes) together in
a seamless way.
Although this framework has many distinct advantages, it
suffers from some drawbacks. In this framework, a set
of initial situations which an agent considers possible are
given, then every time the agent performs a sensing action,
situations that do not match the sensing result (e.g., a sens-
ing result shows the light is on, while it is considered off
in the situation) are discarded. A key assumption of the
framework is that all sensing actions must be accurate, an
assumption that is too strong in real-world scenarios. When
sensing actions are not accurate, situations that perfectly
match the actual situation are in fact discarded. Discarding
such situations results in inconsistency and makes subse-
quent reasoning unproceedable.
Let us illustrate this with the following example.
Example 1 (adapted from [22]) Assume that the initial sit-
uation S0 is InR1(S0) ∧ ¬Light1(S0) ∧ ¬Light2(S0) which
states that the agent is in Room 1 (InR1(S0)), the lights
in both Room 1 and Room 2 (assume there are only two
rooms) are off. However, the agent does not know the actual
situation, e.g., which room it is in and whether the lights in
these rooms are on/off. So it considers two possible situa-
tions S1 and S2 at the beginning where
S1 = ¬InR1(S1) ∧ Light1(S1) ∧ Light2(S1)
S2 = InR1(S2) ∧ ¬Light1(S2) ∧ ¬Light2(S2)
It is easy to see that S2 perfectly matches the real situation
Figure 1: The correct situation is discarded when sensing
is not accurate
S0. Not knowing the truth, the agent assigns S1 and S2
with plausibility values 0 and 1 respectively, which are the
κ-rankings in [24] such that the lower the plausibility value
is, the more plausible the situation is. The bottom-half of
Fig.1 illustrates these three situations.
The agent now believes that the most plausible situation
is S1. To confirm, the agent performs a SenseLight ac-
tion which senses whether the light is on in the room that
the agent is currently located. A SenseLight (SL) action is
accurate if it returns the true state of the situation and is
noisy1 when it returns a wrong result. In Fig. 1, a Noisy
SenseLight action is abbreviated as NSL. Given that the
agent is in Room 1 and the light in Room 1 is off, this sens-
ing action is noisy which prompts the agent to believe that
S1 matches this sensing result whilst S2 does not. As a con-
sequence, with this framework in [22], S2, the right situa-
tion, will be discarded. Now with only S1 considered pos-
sible, if the agent performs another sensing action, Sense-
Room (which senses which room the agent is located) and
it is accurate, then the agent immediately find that it faces
an inconsistency (that is, the result of SenseRoom tells the
agent it is in room R1 while the only possible situation
shows it is not in R1) and cannot proceed. That is, noisy
sensing cannot be handled properly by the framework.
In this paper, we extend the framework in [22] to manage
noisy sensing actions. By using non-fixed plausibility val-
ues for situations, our formalism does not need to discard
any situations but only changes their plausibility values,
which makes it possible to accept noisy sensing actions.
An important result is that we prove that rare noisy sensing
1Note that the agent itself does not know whether a sensing
action is accurate or noisy. The sensing is accurate or not is in-
dependent to the agent and the statistics of the accuracy of the
sensing device (or sensing method) can be obtained in some way,
such as training.
does not play crucial roles in detecting the environment.
More precisely, if the ratio of noisy sensing w.r.t. accurate
sensing is relatively small, then an agent should be able to
detect the actual situation. Furthermore, when the ratio is
not that small but is restricted to a certain degree, the agent
is still able to obtain a degree of chance for detecting the
actual situation. On the other hand, when every sensing ac-
tion is accurate, our extended framework is capable of dis-
covering what can be derived from the framework in [22].
In addition, a set of desirable properties are proved to hold
for this new formalism. In summary, we have the following
main contributions.
• With the new framework, an agent can continue to
proceed with noisy sensing actions.
• We prove that it does not affect the detection of the
actual situation if there are only a few noisy sensing
actions. Moreover, if the ratio of noisy sensing actions
is restricted to a certain degree, then the framework
has a very good chance to detect the actual situation.
• When all sensing actions are accurate, the beliefs that
can be induced by the framework of [22] can also be
induced from our framework.
• Belief introspection, mistaken beliefs, belief revision
and update can all be well handled in our framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide
the preliminaries on situation calculus in Sec. 2. In Sec.
3, some definitions and axioms needed by our framework
are introduced. In Sec. 4, properties of our framework are
proposed. Sec. 5 extends Example 1 to illustrate our ex-
tended framework. Finally, we discuss some related work
and conclude the paper in Sec. 6 and Sec. 7, respectively.
2 Background
The framework in [22] is based on an extension of the ac-
tion theory [17] stemming from situation calculus [14, 15].
Here we introduce the notion of situation calculus from
[22] which includes a belief operator [19, 20].
The situation calculus is a predicate calculus language for
representing dynamically changing domains. A situation
represents a snapshot of the domain. There is a set of initial
situations corresponding to the ways agents believe what
the domain might be initially. The actual initial state is
represented by a distinguished initial situation constant, S0,
which may or may not be among the set of initial situations
believed by an agent. The term do(a, s) denotes the unique
situation that results from the agent performing action a in
situation s.
A predicate (or function) whose value may change upon a
situation (its last argument), is called a fluent. For instance,
we use the fluent InR1(s) to represent that the agent is in
room R1 in situation s. The effects of actions on fluents are
defined using successor state axioms [17], which provide a
succinct representation for both effect axioms and frame
axioms [14, 15]. For instance, in Example 1, if there is an
action Leave which takes the agent from the current room
to the other room, then the successor state axiom for InR1
is:
InR1
(
do(a, s)
)
≡((
¬InR1(s) ∧ a = Leave
)
∨
(
InR1(s) ∧ a 6= Leave
))
.
This axiom says that the agent will be in Room 1 after do-
ing action a in s iff either it is in Room 2 and leaves for
Room 1 or is currently in Room 1 and does not leave.
Levesque [9] introduced a predicate, SF(a, s), to describe
the result of performing the binary-valued sensing action a.
SF(a, s) holds (returns true) iff the sensor associated with
a returns the sensing value 1 in situation s. Each sensing
action senses some property of the domain. The property
sensed by an action is associated with the action using a
guarded sensed fluent axiom [5]. For example, the follow-
ing two axioms
InR1(s)→
(
SF(SenseLight, s) ≡ Light1(s)
)
¬InR1(s)→
(
SF(SenseLight, s) ≡ Light2(s)
)
can be used to specify that the SenseLight action senses
whether the light is on in the room the agent is currently
located in Example 1. Let φ[s] denote that fluent φ is be-
lieved at s, and M(a, s) = SF(a, s) ≡ φ[s] denote that the
sensing result matches s, if a is used to sense φ.
Scherl and Levesque [19, 20] defined a successor state ax-
iom for B, an accessibility relation on situations based on
the possible-worlds semantics by [16], that shows how ac-
tions, including sensing actions, affect the beliefs of an
agent.
B
(
s′′, do(a, s)
)
≡ ∃s′, (1)[
B(s, s′) ∧ s′′ = do(a, s′) ∧
(
SF(a, s′) ≡ SF(a, s)
)]
.
The situations s′′ that areB-related to do(a, s) are the ones
resulting from doing action a in a situation s′, s.t., the sen-
sor associated with a has the same value in s′ as it has in
s, where (informally) a situation s is B-related to another
situation s′ if in situation s, the agent considers s′ is also
possible. It follows the Kripke semantics.
Similar to [22], we take the following conventions about
the guarded action theories Σ consisting of: (A) succes-
sor state axioms for each fluent, and guarded sensed fluent
axioms for each action; (B) unique names axioms for ac-
tions, and domain-independent foundational axioms; and
(C) initial state axioms which describe the initial state of
the domain and the initial beliefs of agents. A domain-
dependent fluent means a fluent other than B or pl (the
plausibility of situations that will be defined later), and
a domain-dependent formula is one that only mentions
domain-dependent fluents. We further assume that there
is only one agent acting in a chosen domain, although the
framework is capable of accommodating multiple agents.
In addition, we assume that there are only finite initial sit-
uations considered by the agent.
3 Definitions and Axioms
In this section, we extend the framework in [22] to include a
non-fixed plausibility operator to account for iterated belief
changes in the situation calculus. The non-fixed plausibil-
ities of situations enable us not to discard any situations,
and hence the accessibility relation B becomes very suc-
cinct. Surprisingly, it has a more expressive power than
that in [22].
The revised accessibility relation B is defined as follows.
B
(
s′′, do(a, s)
)
≡ ∃s′,
[
B(s, s′) ∧ s′′ = do(a, s′)
]
. (2)
It is clearly much simpler than Equation 1. Equation 2
ensures that if a set of situations are B-related, then their
successors are also B-related, and so on. That is, if initially
we have a set of B-related situations, then after the first
action is taken, the successors of these situations are also
B-related; after the second action is taken, the 2nd set of
successors are again B-related.
We define a plausibility function pl for each situation s to
measure how plausible an agent considers s to be. The pl
function is in line with Spohn’s ordinal conditional func-
tions whose range is the set of natural numbers including
0. A lower pl(s) value indicates a higher plausibility level
of s. The pl functions for the initial situations are given,
with at least one s having pl(s) = 0 showing the greatest
plausibility level, using an initial state axiom as:
Axiom 1 (Initial State Axiom) ∃s, Init(s) ∧ pl(s) = 0.
Let m
def
= maxs:Init(s)pl(s) be the maximum pl value
(hence the minimal plausibility level) of the initial situa-
tions and ta,s
def
= mins′:B(s′,s)∧M(a,s′)=truepl(s
′) be the min-
imum pl value among the B-related situations of s that
match the sensing result of a. Plausibility values of succes-
sor situations are defined by the following successor state
axiom:
Axiom 2 (Successor State Axiom)
pl
(
do(a, s)
)
=
{
pl(s)− ta,s a ∈ SA ∧ M(a, s) = true
pl(s) +m+ 1 a ∈ SA ∧M(a, s) = false
pl(s) a 6∈ SA,
Here and subsequently, we use SA to denote the set of all
sensing actions, hence a ∈SA indicates that a is a sensing
action. The successor state axiom for pl says that if a is not
a sensing action, then the successor situation has the same
plausibility as its predecessor; if a is a sensing action and
the current situation matches the sensing result, then the
plausibility level of the successor situation should increase
(i.e., the plausibility value decreases), and the plausibility
of the successor of the most plausible situation is changed
to 0 (for normalization); if a is a sensing action but the
current situation does not match the sensing result, then the
plausibility level of its successor should decrease, hence
the plausibility value is increased by m + 1 to make sure
it be greater than any of B-related situations that match the
sensing result. This axiom follows a similar manner to OCF
conditionalization [24].
This successor state axiom for pl follows the spirit of the in-
tuition stated for the plausibility settings in [22] that if the
accessible situation agrees with the actual situation upon
the result of a sensing action, the plausibility of the acces-
sible should increase (i.e., its κ-ranking should decrease),
otherwise the plausibility should decrease. However, this
intuition was not implemented in the pl function in [22]
because it is considered in conflict with positive and neg-
ative introspection of beliefs [22]. Instead, the framework
adopted a fixed plausibility value for each situation and its
successors (although discarding some situations makes the
beliefs changeable). Our Axiom 2 can be seen as an im-
provement over this fixed value framework and offers an
opportunity to allow flexible changes of plausibilities of
situations and hence beliefs (and still be able to handle in-
trospections).
The belief operator Bel is defined as follows.
Definition 1
Bel(φ, s)
def
= ∀s′
(
B(s′, s) ∧ pl(s′) = 0→ φ[s′]
)
.
That is, φ is believed at s when it holds at all the most plau-
sible situations that are B-related to s. This is intuitively
the same as the one defined in [22]. The only difference is
that in our framework, the plausibility values are not fixed
and we always haveB-related situations which have a plau-
sibility value 0.
For initializing the B-related situations, we have
Axiom 3 ∀s, s′, Init(s) ∧ Init(s′)→ B(s′, s).
That is, all initial situations are B-related to each other.
Note that this axiom and the definition of B relations to-
gether ensure that an initial situation will not be accessible
by a non-initial situation.
Coupling with Equation 2, we have
Theorem 1 ∀s, s′, B(s′, s) →
(
∀s′′, B(s′′, s′) ≡
B(s′′, s)
)
.
That is, B is transitive and Euclidean, hence the positive
and negative introspection of beliefs holds in our frame-
work.
Actually, Equation (2) and Axiom 3 imply that all situa-
tions having the same number of antecedents are mutually
accessible. This means that the B-relation does not play a
crucial role in this paper. But we keep this relation to make
the analog with related work obvious.
4 Properties
In this section, we first present the key contribution of the
paper, noisy sensing tolerance, which is beyond previous
approaches. We then provide the counterparts of proper-
ties given in [22] which demonstrate that our framework
faithfully extend their framework to noisy sensing situa-
tions. To make the comparisons easier to follow, in the
corresponding subsections below, we have adopted many
notations and results proposed in [22].
4.1 Noisy Sensing Tolerance
In this subsection, we show that our framework can deal
with noisy sensing properly. More precisely, we prove that
in the sense of probability, rare noisy sensing actions do not
prevent an agent from deriving the actual situation.
To differentiate accurate sensing from noisy ones, for any
sensing action a, let aT and aF denote that a is accurate or
noisy, respectively2. Let P be a probability function that
measures the statistical outcome of the accuracy of sensing
actions performed by an agent [2]. For instance, P (a =
aT ) ≈ 1 is interpreted as in a large number of experimental
runs, the chance of a being accurate is almost certain and
P (a = aF ) ≈ 0 means it is very rare that a returns a false
result.
Definition 2 A situation calculus about a domain is called
sensing-sensitive if there is a sequence (multi-set) of ac-
tions SEQ = {a1, · · · , an} such that:
• ∀ai ∈ SEQ, if ai ∈ SA, then ai = aTi .
• Let S∗ be the actual situation3, and
S be any situation, then S ≡ S∗ iff
SF
(
ai, do(ai−1, do(ai−2, · · · , S) · · ·)
)
=
SF
(
ai, do(ai−1, do(ai−2, · · · , S∗) · · ·)
)
, ∀ai ∈
SA ∩ SEQ.
Sensing-sensitive means that the actual situation can be
uniquely determined by an agent after taking a sequence
of accurate sensing actions and other physically executable
actions. This issue was not explicitly considered in [22] but
could be seen as a default assumption for their framework.
2Again here the phrase accurate or noisy is for the sensing
device. The agent does not know whether each sensing is accurate
or noisy, and he does not need to know. All he needs is the ability
to train the device to obtain its probability of accuracy.
3The actual situation is the true state of the current environ-
ment. Generally an agent does not know the actual situation, but
it is able to know given this sensing-sensitive property.
Example 2 (Example 1 Cont’) Suppose all sensing actions
are accurate, then the actual situation could be detected by
a sequence of actions SEQ = {SR,SL, LEAVE,SL} where
SR indicates that the agent senses whether it is in Room 1;
LEAVE indicates that the agent leaves the current room for
the other room; and SL is the same as in Example 1.
If SR,SL, SL are all accurate, then it is easy
to see that S2 satisfies that for any sens-
ing action ai in SEQ (i.e., SR, SL,SL), s.t.,
SF
(
ai, do(ai−1, do(ai−2, · · · , S2) · · ·)
)
=
SF
(
ai, do(ai−1, do(ai−2, · · · , S0) · · ·)
)
, while S1 does not.
Let sn be a situation believed by an agent after n actions,
and Sn0 be the actual situation at the time these n actions
were taken. Let I(X) be an indication function s.t. I(X) =
1 if Σ |= X and I(X) = 0 otherwise. Now we show that
the agent is able to detect the actual situation in the long
run.
Theorem 2 If P (a = aT |a ∈ SA) ≈ 1
and if the framework is sensing-sensitive, then
∀φ, s, limn→+∞
∑n
i=1
I(Bel(φ,sn)≡Bel(φ,Sn0 ))
n = 1.
That is, if the noisy sensing actions are rare, and the frame-
work is able to detect the actual situation by a sequence of
accurate sensing actions, then after taking a finite number
of actions, it can be sure that the actual situation can be
detected in a probabilistic manner.
The proof is not difficult when the agent executes actions
SEQ = {a1, · · · , ak} repeatedly. Indeed for any sensing ac-
tion a, let P (a = aT |a ∈ SA) > 1 − ² where ² > 0 is
an arbitrarily small real number, then it is easy to show that
the expected accuracy rate for question whether the situa-
tion the agent detected is the actual situation, is no less than
1 − k². Therefore, from a mathematical result on stochas-
tic process, when n → +∞,
∑n
i=1
I(Bel(φ,sn)≡Bel(φ,Sn0 ))
n
reduces to the above expected rate and from ²→ 0, we get
the result.
As a corollary, if there is only a limited number of noisy
sensing actions, then the agent is supposed to be able to de-
tect the actual situation too. Let |M | denote the cardinality
of a set M .
Corollary 1 If |{a : a ∈ SA ∧ a = aF }| < +∞ and the
framework is sensing-sensitive, then ∃N > 0, ∀n > N ,
sn ≡ Sn0 .
However, if the probability of noisy sensing actions cannot
be ignored, we have the following result.
Theorem 3 If the framework is sensing-sensitive,
then ∀φ, s, limn→+∞
∑n
i=1
I(Bel(φ,sn)≡Bel(φ,Sn0 ))
n ≥∏
ai∈SEQ P (ai = a
T
i ).
That is, even if the noisy sensing actions appear frequently,
we may still have a (relatively good) chance to obtain the
true situation in the long run.
4.2 Recovering the Beliefs in (Shapiro et al. 2011)
Similar to [22], for clarity, if there is no confusion, the sit-
uation argument of a fluent is often omitted in a belief op-
erator, e.g., Bel(InR1, s). For comparison, let ΣS denote
a guarded action theory used in [22] (with different defi-
nitions of B relations and successive state axioms for pl)
in contrast to using Σ for a guarded action theory in our
framework. Similarly, we use plS and BelS for plausibil-
ity functions and beliefs in [22].
In [22], the successor state axiom for pl is defined as:
plS(do(a, s)) = plS(s). (3)
Its belief operator is defined as:
BelS(φ, s)
def
= ∀s′,
B(s′, s) ∧ (∀s′′, B(s′′, s)→ plS(s′) ≤ plS(s′′))→ φ[s′].
Two axioms for initializing the B-related situations are
used [22] to complete its framework.
Axiom 4 [22] Init(s) ∧ B(s′, s) →
(
∀s′′, B(s′′, s′) ≡
B(s′′, s)
)
.
This axiom requires that B-relations to be transitive and
Euclidean initially. The aim is to obtain positive and nega-
tive introspection of beliefs.
Axiom 5 [22] Init(s) ∧B(s′, s)→ Init(s′).
This axiom says that an agent considers nothing happened
initially, hence any situations that are B-related to an initial
situation are themselves initial.
Now we have the following result.
Theorem 4 If ∀a ∈ SA, a = aT , then for any φ, s, ifΣS |=
BelS(φ, s), then Σ |= Bel(φ, s).
This theorem shows that when all sensing actions are accu-
rate, our framework truly discovers the beliefs which can
be induced by the framework in [22].
The proof of the above theorem is not difficult. In fact, it is
easy to show that if all sensing actions are accurate, then the
situations that do not match the sensing results will hence-
forth have no chance to influence the change of beliefs, just
like being discarded by the B-relations as done in [22].
4.3 Belief Revision
Belief revision studies how an agent’s beliefs can be
changed based on some new information if the new infor-
mation must be believed. Sensing actions are a way of ob-
taining certain new information that an agent can use to
revise its beliefs about the actual situation without actually
changing the environment. Sensing actions do not change
any fluents, instead they modify the pl values correspond-
ing to the degrees of beliefs of an agent. Therefore studying
belief revision in situation calculus is a natural course for
managing an agent’s beliefs. In the following, we assume
that for each formula φ to be revised, there is a correspond-
ing sensing action.
Definition 3 (Uniform formula, adapted from [22]) A for-
mula is uniform if it contains no unbound variables.
Definition 4 (Revision action for φ, adapted from [22])
A revision action A for a uniform formula φ with re-
spect to action theory Σ is a sensing action that satisfies
the following condition for every domain-dependent fluent
F : Σ |= [∀s, SF (A, s) ≡ φ[s]] ∧ [∀s∀−→x , F (−→x , s) ≡
F (−→x , do(A, s))], −→x is the set of arguments of F .
It means that A is a sensing action for φ which does not
change any physical fluent. The following two theorems
provided in [22] also hold in our framework.
Theorem 5 Let φ be a domain-dependent, uniform for-
mula, and A be a revision action for φ w.r.t. Σ, then we
have:
Σ |= [∀s, φ[s]→ Bel(φ, do(A, s))]
∧[∀s,¬φ[s]→ Bel(¬φ, do(A, s))].
This theorem proves that revision in our framework is han-
dled adequately. That is, if the sensor indicates that φ holds,
then the agent will believe that φ holds after performing A.
Conversely, if the sensor shows that φ does not hold, then
the agent will believe ¬φ after performing A. This theorem
is also consistent with the framework in [19, 20].
Theorem 6 Let A be a revision action for domain-
dependent, uniform formula φ w.r.t. Σ, then the following
sentence is satisfiable:
Σ∪{Bel(¬φ, S0), Bel(φ, do(A,S0)),¬Bel(FALSE, do(A,S0))}.
This theorem shows that even if the agent believes ¬φ in
S0, it will believe φ after performing A when action A
senses that φ is true, and still maintains consistent beliefs
(¬Bel(FALSE, do(A,S0))).
4.4 Introspection
Like [19, 20, 22], our framework supports belief introspec-
tion.
Theorem 7 Σ |= [Bel(φ, s) → Bel(Bel(φ), s)] ∧[¬Bel(φ, s)→ Bel(¬Bel(φ), s)].
This is not surprising, since in our framework the B-
relation is transitive and Euclidean.
Note that in [22], the beliefs are induced from the most
plausible B-related situations instead of from all B-related
situations. The proof of the above theorem is simply similar
to the proof of Theorem 26 in [22].
In [22], it is argued that variations of their formalization
where plausibility values are updated lead to problems with
introspection. They may produce counterintuitive results
about future beliefs (cf. [22] for details). Note that vari-
ations mentioned in [22] have plausibilities between B-
accessible situations, while our plausibility is assigned to
single situations, so our framework does not have such
weakness, as can be seen from Theorem 4 (showing that we
will not produce counterintuitive results since the frame-
work [22] does not) and Theorem 7 (showing that intro-
spection holds).
4.5 Awareness of errors
As in [22], suppose that an agent believes ¬φ in s, however
after performing a revision action A in s, the agent discov-
ers that φ is true and believes φ. Then in do(A, s), the agent
should believe that in the previous situation s, φ was true,
but it believed φ was false. In other words, the agent should
realize that it was mistaken about φ in s.
Definition 5 ([22]) Prev(φ, s) def= ∃a, s′, s.t., s =
do(a, s′) ∧ φ[s′].
Prev(φ, s) denotes that φ was held in the situation imme-
diately before s.
The following theorem provided in [22] also holds here.
Theorem 8 Let A be a revision action for a domain-
dependent, uniform formula φ w.r.t. Σ, then: Σ |=
∀s,Bel(¬φ, s) ∧ Bel(φ, do(A, s)) → Bel(Prev(φ ∧
Bel(¬φ)), do(A, s)).
The ability of belief update [22] is also provable from our
framework. We omitted it here due to space limitation.
5 Example
We now extend Example 1 to illustrate our framework.
Example 3 Assumption: one agent with three actions: the
agent leaves the current room and enters the other room
(LEAVE); the agent senses whether it is in Room 1 (SR);
the agent senses whether the light is on in the room it is
currently located (SL). And for noisy sensing, we annotate
it as NSL. Note that the agent itself does not know whether
the sensing is accurate or not.
The successor state axioms and guarded sensed fluent ax-
ioms for the example are as follows:
Light1
(
do(a, s)
)
≡ Light1(s)
Figure 2: Extension of Example 1
Light2
(
do(a, s)
)
≡ Light2(s)
InR1
(
do(a, s)
)
≡((
¬InR1(s) ∧ a = Leave
)
∨
(
InR1(s) ∧ a 6= Leave
))
TRUE→
(
SF(LEAVE, s) ≡ TRUE
)
InR1(s)→
(
SF(SL, s) ≡ Light1(s)
)
¬InR1(s)→
(
SF(SL, s) ≡ Light2(s)
)
TRUE→
(
SF(SR, s) ≡ InR1(s)
)
The initial states including the actual initial state are stated
in Example 1. The initial state axioms for S1, S2 are:(
∃s, Init(s) ∧ pl(s) = 0
)
∧
(
∀s, Init(s) ∧ pl(s) = 0 →
¬InR1(s) ∧ Light1(s) ∧ Light2(s)
)(
∃s, Init(s) ∧ pl(s) = 1
)
∧
(
∀s, Init(s) ∧ pl(s) = 1 →
InR1(s) ∧ ¬Light1(s) ∧ ¬Light2(s)
)
State axioms for other states are similar and omitted here.
For simplicity, we only give an informal explanation of the
first two steps in the process depicted by Figure 2.
• The first action is a noisy light sensing, which gives the
result that the light is on in the room the agent is lo-
cated. As the agent thinks it is in Room 2, S1 matches
the sensing result whilst S2 does not. Based on Axiom
2 (Sec. 3), the plausibility value of S12 increases to 2.
• The second action is the room sensing, which tells the
agent that it is in Room 1 not Room 2. Hence the agent
reassigns S22 with plausibility 0 and S
2
1 with 1. Now
its belief is in accord with S22 .
In fact, we can see that the action sequence
SR,SL, LEAVE, SL makes the situation calculus sens-
ing sensitive. Also note that the framework in [22] cannot
proceed after the sensing action SR.
6 Related Work
In [3], the problem of noisy sensors is also studied and a
probabilistic method is applied for such situations. That is,
the probability of a sensing action result follows a Gaus-
sian distribution. In addition, the beliefs induced from the
situations are also probabilistic. This approach is extended
in [23] to study its properties and allows for using condi-
tional probability densities in the noisy sensor readings. To
some extent it could be seen as a probabilistic counterpart
of our framework although noisy sensing tolerance is not
addressed in these papers.
In [21], the noisy sensor problem is also studied by adding
plausibility values into the B-relation, i.e., B(s′, n, s)
which means that in s, the agent thinks s′ is possible with a
plausibility value n. Similar to our approach, noisy sensing
results will affect the n value based on whether the situ-
ation matches the sensing result. However, in [22], it is
discussed that this kind of accessibility relations, together
with the transitive and Euclidean condition required by be-
lief introspection, conflicts with any reasonable plausibility
update scheme for accurate sensors.
In [6], a fluent calculus framework is proposed to deal with
the problem of observations contradicting the model which
is to some extent similar to noisy sensing. However, in
the formalism, the state ranking change axioms need the
details of actions which make the formalism somehow lose
generality.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a framework which can deal
with noisy sensing actions and can handle nested beliefs,
belief introspection, mistaken beliefs, belief revision and
belief update. In addition, we show that rare noisy sensing
does not prevent an agent from detecting the actual situ-
ation, and limited noisy sensing allows for a certain de-
gree of detecting the actual situation. Moreover, we show
that our framework induces what can be discovered by the
framework of [22] when all sensing actions are accurate.
Due to space limitation, in this paper, we do not provide
the comparison of our framework with the various belief
change postulates, e.g., AGM belief revision postulates [1],
KM belief update postulates [7], DP iterated belief revision
postulates [4], epistemic state revision postulates [12], be-
lief change postulates [10, 11], etc. However, we can prove
that our framework satisfies most of the postulates men-
tioned above. Especially, DP’s C2 postulate is satisfied in
our framework, whilst in [22], C2 cannot be defined.
For future work, we want to extend our framework to mul-
tiple agent scenarios. It is also very interesting to study
whether an agent can realize that the previous sensing is in-
accurate in belief introspection. In addition, a study of the
relationship between our framework and the Partially Ob-
servable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) [18] could be
helpful.
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